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The Baring Crisis is the nineteenth century's most famous sovereign debt crisis. Few studies, however,
have attempted to understand the extent to which the crisis mattered for countries other than Argentina
and England. Using a new database consisting of more than 15,000 observations of weekly sovereign
debt prices, we assess the extent to which the Barings Crisis affected other emerging market borrowers
and find empirical evidence of a regional crisis. We find that Latin American yield spreads increased
by more than 200 basis points during the crisis relative to the rest of the world, even after controlling
for macroeconomic, trade, political-institutional factors, and other country-specific effects. Our evidence
suggests that European investors may have sold off or reduced their holdings of Latin American securities
in the wake of the Baring Crisis.
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The widespread occurrence of emerging market financial crises in the past two decades 
has sparked interest among economists and investors in understanding their nature, causes, and 
consequences. These episodes are often characterized by volatile capital flows, unsustainable or 
non-credible commitments to fixed exchange rates, currency mismatches, liquidity mismatches, 
and weak regulation and supervision of banking systems. Other studies have emphasized the role 
of contagion, the process through which a shock in one country can lead to a price movement in 
another country in excess of the underlying fundamentals (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Forbes and 
Claessens, 2001; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2003). For example, some research has pointed 
to the role of asymmetric information, informed and uniformed investors, and political variables 
in the transmission of the Asian financial crisis (Calvo, 1999; Drazen, 1999; Hahm and Mishkin, 
2000; Radelet and Sachs, 1998). Other studies have noted the importance of common creditors in 
propagating crises. To reduce overall portfolio risk, financial institutions in the common-creditor 
country (one with large holdings of emerging market debt) reduce and/or sell off their assets in 
the entire region, especially in countries that have characteristics similar to the crisis country 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998; Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens, 2000). The significant real-side 
effects of recent financial crises (Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria, 2001; 
International Monetary Fund, 1998) has prompted some policymakers to call for a reform of the 
international financial architecture (Goldstein, 1998; Eichengreen, 1999).   
To provide some historical insight into the global and regional effects of financial crisis, 
this paper turns back the clock and examines the most famous sovereign debt default of the 
nineteenth century – the Baring Crisis of 1890.
 1  The crisis originated in Argentina, and was then 
                                                 
1 For related discussion on this point, see Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2002), which examines monthly 
sovereign yield spreads over the entire gold standard period for 16 emerging market countries and Bordo   2
transmitted back to London via the House of Baring (an investment bank in London that held 
large amounts of Argentine debt that could not be placed in the London market).
2 Most previous 
studies have examined the effect of the crisis on Argentina or the Bank of England’s rescue 
operation of the House of Baring. We break new ground by thoroughly examining the global 
effects of the Baring Crisis on a sample of 41 emerging market borrowers. Using a new database 
of over 15,000 weekly sovereign debt prices collected from the Economist, the empirical analysis 
of sovereign yield spreads suggests that the Baring Crisis was primarily a regional crisis. The 
country risk premium for Latin American countries increased by more than 840 basis points 
between 1890 and 1891, and more than 1,600 basis points between 1890 and 1895. In contrast, 
yield spreads for non-Latin emerging markets and “core” countries (high income European 
countries and the U.S.) were generally flat or unchanged during this period. 
We next construct a panel data set consisting of annual data for 35 sovereign borrowers, 
which includes macroeconomic indicators, trade variables, political and institutional factors, and 
other country-specific controls. The results from the fixed-effect regressions suggest that bond 
yields in Latin-American countries were more than 200 basis points higher as a direct result of the 
Baring Crisis – even after we control for macroeconomic fundamentals (such as its debt burden, 
budget deficit, and trade balance) and other country-specific effects (including gold-standard 
membership and whether it was involved in a conflict). This finding is consistent with the 
literature on modern crises and contagion that emphasizes their regional nature (Glick and Rose, 
1999; Calvo and Reinhart, 1996). We also find some evidence that the crisis may have spread 
through trade. Finally, we discuss why European investors may have sold off or reduced their 
holdings of Latin American securities in the wake of the Baring Crisis 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Eichengreen (1999), which provides a chronology of banking and currency crises between 1870 and 
1973. 
2 For examples, see della Paolera and Taylor (2001), Eichengreen (1999), Ford (1956, 1962), and Williams 
(1920).    3
In the next section, we provide some historical background on the crisis. Section III 
describes our new database of sovereign debt prices, calculates spreads, and presents graphical 
and summary evidence regarding the effects of the crisis on emerging market borrowers. Section 
IV then examines the evidence concerning the regional nature of the Barings crisis using our 
annual panel dataset. The last section offers some concluding comments about the global nature 
of the crisis.  
 
II. The Baring Crisis of 1890 
 
The world debt crisis of 1873 and the ensuing recession had large economic effects on 
Argentina and Latin America. The region did not recover from the downturn until the early 1880s 
– after the resolution to wars with indigenous peoples living in the pampas in the late 1870s. With 
the election of the war hero, Julio Roca, as president, Argentina witnessed a resurgence of foreign 
trade and capital flows from Europe. The funds were used to construct railroads and public works 
and modernize Buenos Ayres (Marichal, 1989). Roca’s first major loan was a railway issue that 
completed two major trunk lines. The construction of a transportation network throughout the 
country further consolidated the central government’s power and stimulated economic activity by 
opening up the market for commercial agriculture. Roca also transformed Buenos Ayres into the 
“Paris of South America” by constructing broad avenues, spacious parks, a well-functioning 
water supply and drainage system, and a modern port. Between 1880 and 1886, the national 
authorities and the government of the province of Buenos Ayres carried out a series of 
unprecedented state-run development projects in Latin America (Marichal, 1989).  
As a result of the open capital markets that prevailed in the nineteenth century, Argentina 
was able to borrow extensively abroad. It was the fifth largest sovereign borrower in the world. It 
absorbed roughly 11 percent of all new issues in the new London market between 1884 and 1890 
and 40 to 50 percent of all lending that occurred outside the United Kingdom in 1889. (In 
contrast, North America had a population 20 times Argentina’s and floated only 30 percent of the   4
new issues in London.)
3 Taylor (2003, p.177) suggests that “the 1880s stand out as a period of 
totally unprecedented capital inflows into an emerging market at any time in history.” The current 
account deficit, as a percent of GDP, averaged 20 percent from 1884 to 1889. 
Although the economic policies of the 1880s stimulated short-run economic activity in 
Argentina, they posed potentially serious long-run financing challenges. The financing of 
railroads and land improvement projects were aimed at promoting internal development, exports, 
and economic growth. But the slow maturation of the development projects could impede the 
country’s ability to service its debts creating a maturity mismatch problem. The expanding 
national debt could only be serviced if the country had sufficient tax revenues for debt service. 
Unfortunately, it would take years before the government would realize significant revenues from 
commercial activity stimulated by the infrastructure investments (Ford, 1956). In addition, 
Argentina issued bonds in sterling or gold on European capital markets while the country 
operated on a paper standard (following several failed attempts in the early-to-mid 1880s to adopt 
a gold or bimetallic standard). The currency mismatch problem meant that a depreciation of the 
paper peso could impair the country’s ability to service its gold debts (della Paolera and Taylor, 
2001).    
  When the brother-in-law of President Roca, Miguel Celman, succeeded him as president 
of Argentina in 1886 in a fraudulent election, the newly elected leader sold the Central Norte and 
Andino railways (two of the country’s most important railways) to British capitalists with the 
intention of reducing the country’s rising debt level.  Even though the government stopped 
borrowing funds to finance new railway projects, it did not restore fiscal discipline; instead, it 
began issuing additional debt through state banks. From 1886 to 1890, Argentina passed a series 
of “banking reforms” that fueled the expansion of credit and paper money issues (Williams, 
1920). National and Provincial Banking authorities ratified a Free Banking Law in 1887 which 
authorized any banking association to issue notes provided that it purchased gold bonds to the full 
                                                 
3 della Paolera and Taylor (2001, p.53) and Eichengreen (1999).   5
amount of the notes issued. As noted by della Paolera and Taylor (2001), there were several 
problems with the law even though it was modeled along the lines of what was used in the U.S. 
under the National Banking Acts. The Argentine permitted banks meeting minimum capital 
requirements to issue paper notes backed by government gold bonds. The bank notes, however, 
were not redeemable in gold, and since the gold bonds were new issues, they constituted a new 
liability on the government’s balance sheet. The banks that participated in the note issuance 
scheme floated loans in Europe to finance the purchase of the domestic gold bonds that backed 
note issuance. This scheme worked as long as foreign investors agreed to purchase the Argentine 
bonds and as long as additional note issuances were backed 100 percent by specie. Foreign 
investors, however, essentially were backing a credit boom in Argentina, financed by the issuance 
of new paper currency.
4 By 1890, Argentine provincial banks had issued more than 30 million 
pounds of debt on foreign capital markets. 
Beginning in the mid-1880s, loose monetary and fiscal policies substantially worsened 
macroeconomic conditions in Argentina. The monetary base grew at an annual average rate of 18 
percent (driven by the issuance of paper currency emissions), inflation averaged 17 percent, and 
the paper peso depreciated at an average rate of 19 percent between 1884 and 1890 (della Paolera 
and Taylor, 2001, p.80). Argentina was also running a substantial budget deficit. The Argentine 
economy worsened towards the end of the decade, with as much as 40 percent of foreign 
borrowing going towards debt service and 60 percent of imports going towards the purchase of 
(non-investment) consumption goods. Railway net profits were declining and gold pesos were 
trading at a large premium (94 percent) relative to paper pesos (Fishlow, 1989, p.88). The former 
finance minister Jose Terry suggested that, “until the end of 1887, it was possible to save the 
patient: in 1888, it already was no longer possible.”
5 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion, see della Paolera and Taylor (2001). 
5 Quoted in Fishlow (1989, p.88).   6
By the end of the decade, it was becoming clear to the financial community that paper 
pesos were inadequate to cover the normal service on the internal and external debt. In 1889, the 
government broke its promise and paid off some of its gold-denominated liabilities with paper 
currency. In response, primary issues on the London market were met with a tepid response, and 
investors dumped paper pesos in anticipation of a further decline in its value. The government 
used the gold (that backed the note issues) to defend the exchange rate, but by December 1889, 
the stock of gold at the Banco Nacional had dwindled such that it could no longer carry out this 
intervention in the currency market. Strikes, demonstrations, and a failed coup by military leaders 
erupted in 1889-1890 as the real wage of Argentine workers declined with the rising price level. 
Domestic political strife further reduced the willingness of foreign investors to hold Argentine 
securities. The questionable fiscal and monetary policies drained the banking system of specie, 
provoked multiple banks to experience runs beginning in 1890, and thus ushered in a financial 
crisis. A series of last-minute tax and fiscal reforms in the summer of 1890 slowed down the 
economic decline, but did not prevent the ensuing financial crisis.  
Even though the Baring Crisis had its origins in Argentina, its effects were quickly felt in 
other parts of the world, including London.
6 Baring Brothers, the firm that underwrote most of 
Argentina’s foreign debt issues, was not sheltered from that country’s problems. The investment 
bank was saddled with the Buenos Aires Water Supply and Drainage Loan, a new debt issue that 
the investment house successfully failed to sell on the London market (Eichengreen, 1995). On 
the verge of bankruptcy and unable to meet its debt obligations, the House of Baring notified the 
Bank of England of its financial problems in early November 1890. The central bank pooled 
resources from the Bank of France, Russia’s central bank, and British financial institutions to 
form a rescue fund to save the troubled financial institution that threatened to bring down British 
                                                 
6 Following (Eichengreen, 1999; della Paolera and Taylor, 2001), we use the phrase “the Baring Crisis” to 
refer to both the distress in Argentina and the problems of the House of Baring in London; however, some 
scholars more narrowly refer to the Baring Crisis as applying only to the events in England and refer 
separately to the Argentine Crisis (Bordo and Murshid, 2001). We view the two events as being 
importantly linked.   7
financial markets. The rescue operation succeeded and prevented a general financial collapse on 
European markets. Although actions by the Bank of England avoided a major financial collapse 
on European markets, the central bank did little to help debt-ridden Argentina.  
Argentina defaulted on nearly ₤48 million of debt in 1890, which ended up constituting 
nearly 60 percent of the world’s defaulted debt in the 1890s. After the Argentine government and 
the House of Baring failed to come to an agreement, Nathan Rothschild formed a committee of 
leading financiers to restructure the country’s debt obligations. The committee demanded that the 
Banco Nacional transfer funds to service the country’s short-term debt obligations (Eichengreen, 
1999). In exchange, the committee agreed to underwrite a bond issue that could meet Argentina’s 
remaining debt service for a period of three years. Argentina subsequently experienced a severe 
banking crisis in January 1891, in part, because of Banco Nacional’s weakened financial position 
brought on by its transfer of assets to British creditors and its support of the Bank of the Province 
of Buenos Aires. The financial crisis worsened. The Bank of London and River Plate was the 
only bank that did not close its doors during the crisis. Argentina’s real GDP fell by 11 percent 
between 1890 and 1891. Argentina suffered a deep recession for several years and did not fully 
recover from the crisis until the turn of the century, following a debt workout and more than a 
decade of monetary and fiscal reforms.  
There is some evidence that the Argentine crisis may have spilled over to other countries 
in the region. Triner and Wandshneider (2005) suggest that the Baring Crisis had significant 
effects on Brazil. Bordo and Murshid (2001) examine cross-country correlations in weekly 
sovereign bond prices for seven countries in the year 1890 and find some evidence of regional 
contagion. Most studies, however, are not very clear as to whether the decline in sovereign debt 
prices was global in nature or confined to Latin America. For example, Fishlow (1989, p.88) 
noted that, “Not only did Argentine issues immediately move to substantial discounts on the 
London market, so also did those of other peripheral countries. Many were forced to reduce their 
debt service in the years that followed.” He also suggests that other emerging market borrowers   8
may have experienced a slower recovery from the crisis in comparison to Argentina. Suter (1992) 
suggests that the Argentine default may have been part of a broader episode of defaults in the 
1890s. Kindelberger (1984) argues that the crisis spread to other Latin American debtors and 
emerging market borrowers in the European periphery, and McLean (2006) suggests that the 
crisis was international in nature and spread from Argentina to Australia. Given that previous 
research has not systematically analyzed the effects of the Baring Crisis on other emerging-
market economies, this paper focuses on determining whether the Baring Crisis was a regional or 
global emerging-market crisis. 
 
III. Movements in Emerging Market Yield Spreads 
 
A. Time Series Evidence 
 
  To provide some insight into the regional and global aspects of the Baring Crisis, we 
collected weekly prices on long-term government bonds from the Economist with maturities 
greater than 10 years.
7 The database contains over 15,000 weekly observations of bond price data 
from the London Stock Exchange for 41 countries and British colonies, for the period 1887-
1895.
8 Unlike Ferguson and Schularick’s (2006) database of annual sovereign yield spreads, our 
sample of emerging market borrowers employs the same long-term bond for the entire sample 
period. The Ferguson and Schularick sample of annual interest rates splices two different bond 
series for many countries in 1889 and 1890, making it difficult to analyze the effects of the 
Baring crisis on sovereign risk.
9 There are several reasons our analysis focuses on the sovereign 
                                                 
7 Par value for all bonds in our sample was 100 pounds sterling.  Maturity length depended on availability.  
8 For a discussion of the terms of each bond employed in the analysis, see the data appendix. 
9 In terms of coverage, our sample and the Ferguson and Schularick database are quite consistent with the 
exception of China and several smaller British colonies (i.e., Ceylon, Hong Kong, Mauritius, and Straits 
Settlement) whose bonds infrequently traded on the London market (see the Economist). China did not 
have a single bond series that traded on the London market for the entire period from 1886-1896. We also 
did not include Bulgaria and Denmark, two countries that only had a couple of years of bond data towards 
the end of our sample period.    9
debt market to measure the economic effects of the Baring Crisis. First, annual GDP estimates 
and other macroeconomic data (such as investment spending) are only available for high-income 
countries and a handful of emerging markets for the gold standard period. Second, many scholars 
have questioned the quality of nineteenth century GDP estimates, especially for the emerging 
market sample, since the figures are often constructed by back-casting and interpolation between 
decadal benchmarks.
10  
In contrast, the sovereign debt market was very liquid during the gold standard period 
and data are available at the weekly frequency for most emerging market countries. High- 
frequency data can be used to identify the effects of important events and policies on sovereign 
debt markets and to measure the overall impact of the crisis on country risk during this turbulent 
period. The sovereign debt market likely provides greater insight into the global effects of the 
Baring Crisis than broad macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP, given its wider coverage, 
higher frequency, and higher quality. 
We constructed yield spreads – or the country risk premium – for each country or colony, 
which is defined as the current yield on a sterling bond for country or colony i minus the yield on 
the “risk-free” British consol at time t.
11 To quantify the regional effects of the crisis, Figures 1-5 
show yield spreads for the 12 Latin American countries in our sample. Each figure contains a 
vertical line, denoting the outbreak of the crisis in Argentina. We dated the onset of the crisis to 
the summer of 1890 based on our reading of the secondary literature and the Investor’s Monthly 
Manual (IMM) – a widely-read British financial publication that provides a weekly summary of 
important events affecting the London money market. Although one might choose a slightly 
different date to mark the genesis of the crisis, as shown in Table 1, the IMM reported a cluster of 
economic and political events that occurred in July and early August 1890, suggesting that British 
                                                 
10 See Maddison (2003) for a discussion. 
11 France, Netherlands, and the United States issued debt in their domestic currency during this period. All 
three countries were on the gold standard from 1880 until the outbreak of World War I. We calculated the 
country risk premium for these three countries by subtracting the current yield of the domestic currency 
bond minus the current yield on the British consol.  10
investors were becoming particularly concerned with the situation in Argentina at this time. The 
Banco Nacional, a major Argentine national bank, informed Baring Brothers in July that it would 
suspend service on its foreign debt obligations, signaling a deeper banking and debt crisis was 
emerging. Finance Minister Francisco Uriburu needed to pass a package of fiscal reforms so that 
the note issues used to prop up the banking system were not seen as the only part of the 
adjustment process. His reform package failed, and he resigned in early July. The government 
tried to lend to note-issuing banks to prevent a liquidity crisis, but without the reform package, a 
banking crisis was not averted, and runs on banks began. A few weeks later, a group of military 
officers unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the Argentine government. President Miguel Juarez 
Celman then resigned on August 6, 1890, in response to public discontent over his decision to 
pursue policies of open inflation and acceptance of external default rather than liquidation of the 
“official” banks.
12  
  The events highlighted by the financial press seem to have signaled to the London bond 
market that Argentina had entered into a serious financial crisis in July and August 1890, and that 
foreign investors were reassessing Argentina’s credit risk. Figure 1 shows the country risk 
premium for Argentina. Yield spreads for Argentine sterling bonds declined from 1887 until 1889 
before dramatically increasing from the summer of 1890 until early 1892. The country risk 
premium fell from its high of 1,400 basis points in 1892 to approximately 800 basis points by 
1896. 
It also appears that the financial press was reconsidering credit risk in other Latin 
American emerging market borrowers. Figure 1 also shows the country risk premia for Brazil and 
Chile. The country risk premium for Brazil rose from 200 basis points in the late summer of 1890 
until it reached its peak at more than 550 basis points in late 1892. The increase in the yield 
                                                 
12 The Foreign Securities Section of the Economist also began devoting more attention to Argentina’s 
economic problems during this period. The Stateman’s Yearbook (1892, p. 331) noted that, “The events of 
July 1890, which caused the resignation of President Juarez Celman and a severe crisis, greatly disturbed 
the resources at the disposal of the Government during the last year.”  11
spread may partially reflect news about domestic political instability in the country. The Brazilian 
yield spread then declined in 1892, briefly rises in 1894, and then falls for the remainder of the 
sample period. The country risk premium for Chile is quite stable until the outbreak of the Baring 
Crisis. The yield spread for Chile increased in 1890-91 following the outbreak of a brief civil war, 
before stabilizing at 225 basis points in 1892. The country risk premium rose again in late 1893 
and then declined to about 210 basis points. 
Figure 2 shows yield spreads for Colombia, Nicaragua, and Honduras. The interest-rate 
differential for Colombia declined in the years leading up to the Baring Crisis. Country risk for 
Colombia rose for the next several years and averages more than 3,000 basis points by the end of 
1896. For Nicaraguan bonds, the yield spread was generally flat in the late 1880s before rising 
gradually after the Baring Crisis. Country risk for the Central American country increased several 
thousand basis points in the early to mid-1890s following the outbreak of a war with Nicaragua 
(Economist, January 27, 1894, p. 122). The yield spread for Honduras declined from nearly 
20,000 to 5,000 basis points prior to the onset of the Baring Crisis. The yield spread then 
increased to 25,000 basis points in 1893 before falling to 15,000 basis points in 1895-96 after the 
conclusion of a war with its Central American rival.
 13  
Figure 3 shows yield spreads for Costa Rica and Guatemala. The yield spread for Costa 
Rica fell by approximately 200 basis points in the years leading up to the Baring Crisis. Country 
risk for the Central American country then increased after the crisis to more than 1,500 basis 
points when the sovereign defaulted on their external debts in 1895. The country risk premium for 
Guatemala fluctuated by around 400 basis points until the summer of 1890 when the yield spread 
increased to more than 1,000 basis points. Yield spreads for the Central American country then 
declined to approximately 600 basis points in 1892-93. Interest-rate differentials for Guatemala 
                                                 
13 We also have some limited data on sovereign bond prices for Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru. Although 
the Economist stopped reporting weekly bond prices for the three countries in 1891-1892, sovereign debt 
prices display time series behavior similar to the other Latin American countries up to this point in time. 
Bond prices declined approximately 30 to 50 percent for these countries.  12
increased in 1894 to more than 1000 basis points as the country defaulted on its foreign debt 
obligations.  Yield spreads then declined to a level of 900 basis points in 1896 after the country 
agreed to a debt workout with bondholders.  
Figure 4 shows the country risk premia for Mexico and Paraguay. The yield spread on 
Mexican bonds is flat in the early part of the sample and then gradually rises from 360 to 500 
basis points between July 1890 and June 1892. The yield spread for Paraguay declined in the 
early part of the sample and then increased from 100 basis points to more than 1,000 basis points 
following a debt default that lasted until 1897. Country risk for Uruguay and Venezuela are 
presented in Figure 5. Country risk for Uruguay followed a U-shaped pattern, dramatically falling 
from a level of more than 450 basis points in the late 1880s to slightly more than 100 basis points 
on the eve of the Baring Crisis. The yield spread then climbed to over 600 basis points by 1892. 
The rise in the country risk premium may reflect, in part, news of a banking and commercial 
crisis in Montevideo that helped lead to a severe recession. Uruguayan debt prices are then not 
quoted on the London market after the country briefly defaulted on its debt obligations. Country 
risk for Venezuela declined by approximately 400 basis points prior to the onset of the Baring 
Crisis. Yield spreads then rose to over 900 basis points in 1892 before declining to a level of 500 
basis points by the end of the sample. 
Consistent with the graphical evidence, the weekly record of the sovereign bond market 
from the financial press suggests that, in addition to any country-specific events that moved 
sovereign spreads, the Baring Crisis may have been a common factor driving Latin American 
securities in the early 1890s.
14 Indeed, the newspaper clippings of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (a British entity representing the interests of sovereign debt holders) suggest that the 
Argentine crisis may have had real economic effects on other Latin American countries. For 
example, the Star and Herald commented on how the banking and merchant relationships 
                                                 
14 Suter (1992, p. 81) states: “Thus, the crisis was triggered by the state insolvency of Argentina, the Latin 
American debtor country most strongly incorporated into the Atlantic economy.”  13
between Argentina and Paraguay transmitted the financial crisis to the landlocked South 
American country
15, and The Bullionist wrote:  
 
“Paraguay, like Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, is undergoing a financial crisis, and this crisis 
was recently described by the Finance Minister to Congress in the form of a report… They were 
traceable, without a doubt, to the condition in the Argentine. There has been a general falling-off 
in trade, which has given rise to a feeling of uneasiness and want of confidence, and since the 
beginning of 1890 things have been getting worse.”
16   
 
The Buenos Aires Standard discussed the economic effects of the Argentine crisis on Uruguay, a 
country with close financial and merchant ties to the South American country: 
“It must be borne in mind that such is the intimate connection between both countries that as long 




In January 1891, the South American Journal called the “the violent economic crisis, which 
overtook the country last July…a logical repercussion of the Argentine crisis and the English 
crisis.”
18  
The events in Barings seem to have also affected Central American borrowers. The South 
American Journal wrote the following about Costa Rica in 1891:  
“The fall in Costa Rica “A” and “B” bonds was not in any way due to the internal affairs of the 
country, but due to the disturbances in July last between Guatemala and Salvador, followed by 
the troubles in the Argentine Republic, producing a depression of all stocks.”
19 
It appears that financial markets may have also been reassessing the debt of the region en 
masse. The reassessment may be due to a “wake-up” or a common creditor channel, two 
explanations given for contagion during the Asian financial crisis.
20 The Economist, for example, 
frequently commented on the effects of events in Argentina on the sovereign debt prices of other 
                                                 
15 “The Argentine crisis has affected the banks and mercantile houses of Paraguay, and under the influence 
of the withdrawals of minted money by the Argentines, paper money has suffered a certain depreciation.” 
Star and Herald, May 14, 1891. 
16 The Bullionist, April 23, 1892. 
17 Buenos Aires Standard, April 21, 1890. 
18 South American Journal, January 24, 1891. 
19 South American Journal, July 18, 1891. 
20 See Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Eschweiler (1997) for evidence of a wake up call in the 1997 East 
Asian Crisis.   14
countries in Latin America. The Economist referred to Central and South American securities in 
the early 1890s as a group distinct from other countries and regions of the world (while at the 
same time noting the importance of country-specific events for all securities). Consider the 
following report from the July 5, 1890, Foreign Securities Section of the Economist:   
 
“The feature in South American descriptions has been the heavy fall in Argentine Cedulas, which 
close about 3 percent lower all round, although the final prices are somewhat above the usual. 
The fall has been due to the great rise in the gold premium at Buenos Ayres-which has resulted 
from the passing by the National Bank of its demand. This action of the Bank has raised anew 
great doubts as to its stability and its ability to get through the present difficulties without 
shipwreck. All other issues such as Uruguay, Brazilian, & c., have given way sympathetically.” 
 
The Times of London also frequently noted that Latin American securities declined in 
price while debt prices for other emerging markets were generally flat: 
“Business has been quiet in the Foreign Market, but the tone was fairly steady, and except in the 
case of South American issues, which were again weak on very discouraging news from Buenos 
Ayres, there are not many changes to report.”
21  
  
The financial press also suggested that investors had difficulty in pricing Latin American 
bonds. This lends credence to the notion that asymmetric information may have played a role in 
the sell off of Latin American securities. On the eve of the financial crisis, June 5, 1890, the 
Financial News noted the lack of information about Latin American securities available to bond 
market investors.   
 
“The market for South American securities is much more extensive than is generally supposed, 
and in it you get a large variety…The dealers are few in number, and they work well together, 
and as a consequence, when there is any movement they secure the fat, and the public get the 
greater portion of the lean. As a matter of fact, it may be greatly doubted if the public know much 
about the features of the market – that is to say, if they have the adequate knowledge which 
would enable them to speculate with any degree of confidence. Of course, most people know 
something – usually rather too much – about Argentina, Brazilians and Uruguays; but when they 
get to such securities as Paraguayan and Colombian bonds, or to the issues of such States as 
Nicaragua and Salvador, they feel, to say the least of it, that, unlike the dyer, their hand is not 




                                                 
21 The Times, August, 24, 1890. 
22 Financial News, June 5, 1890.  15
The Economist also noted a similar problem in assessing the value of Latin American 
securities: 
“Amidst the mass of literature which has seen the light during the past few years concerning the 
River Plate, Brazilian, Chilian, Peruvian, and other South American Republics and their finances, 
comparatively little has been forthcoming to show the British investor what the liabilities of those 
States really amount to…And beyond this, almost the whole of them are weighted down by 
inconvertible and greatly depreciated currencies, in which their revenue and expenses are 
calculated and in which their internal liabilities are expressed; and those internal liabilities, direct, 
contingent, and provincial, are so numerous and difficult to measure that in such a state as the 
Argentine Republic it appears almost hopeless to make order of to them.”
23  
 
The financial press noted that, during the Baring Crisis, it was perhaps easier for 
investors to be indiscriminate rather than try to accurately determine which countries would 
weather the storm. (A similar assessment may have occurred during the early stages of the East 
Asian crisis.)
24 As the New York Times wrote three years after the start of the crisis: 
 
“It must be borne in mind that Brazil has always punctually met all its obligations and therefore 
its credit ought to be reasonably good. Moreover, the Oest de Minas Railway is a fairly good 
property, and the proposed extension will develop a region of the country rich in minerals and of 
wonderful agricultural capabilities…But the public does not discriminate – or rather, in times like 
the present, refuses to be attracted by probabilities. South Americans are in general disrepute, and 
it must be admittedly, deservedly.”
25 
 
The Financial News reported the reaction of bond prices in Latin America in a similar fashion: 
“Then the distrust produced by the financial catastrophe in the Argentines and Uruguay has 
naturally reacted on Brazil, and led most people of ordinary caution to withdraw their money 
from the country, as being tarred with the same brush as other South American republics. Under 
such conditions, nothing but the most conservative financial policy could prevent Brazil from 




                                                 
23 Economist, October17, 1891. 
24 For example, Radelet and Sachs (1998) describe the early stages of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis 
as one in which “creditors made little effort to distinguish between these Southeast Asian economies.” 
25 “England’s Financial Woes: The Ever-Widening Effects of the Baring Failure,” New York Times, May 8, 
1893, p.12. In reference to Uruguay, the South American Journal (August 15, 1891) stated, “The terrible 
Argentine muddle continues to tell against us, and although our situation is simplicity itself compared to 
theirs, we are bound to suffer for the sins and discredit of our big neighbors.” 
26 Financial News. November 6, 1891.   16
To form a preliminary assessment of whether the effects of the crisis had effects on all 
emerging market borrowers, and not just regional sovereign borrowers, Figure 6 graphs the 
average interest rate for Latin and non-Latin emerging markets as well as the core countries in our 
sample. 
We divided our entire sample of countries and colonies into three groups to analyze 
yields of (1) Latin American countries, (2) non-Latin Emerging markets, and (3) core or high-
income European countries and the United States, in the period surrounding the Baring Crisis. 
Our unweighted yield index for Latin America consists of 12 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
27 We 
construct an un-weighted yield index of non-Latin American emerging markets using 22 
countries: Austria, British Guiana, Canada, the Cape of Good Hope, Egypt, Greece, India, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Natal, New South Wales, New Zealand, Norway, Queensland, Russia, South 
Australia, Sweden, Tasmania, the Ottoman Empire (Turkey), Victoria, and Western Australia.
28 
The core country index consists of five high-income European countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Netherlands) and the United States. As shown in Figure 6, interest rates are generally 
quite flat over the sample period for the non-Latin Emerging markets and the core countries. The 
small increase in interest rates for the non-Latin Emerging Market Index can be completely 
attributed to Greece and its debt default in 1893. Bond yields are flat for the non-Latin emerging 
markets over the sample period if Greece is excluded. Interest-rates for Latin American emerging 
markets, however, display a very different pattern, rising from about 800 basis points in 1887 to 
                                                 
27 Although Portugal and Spain are not in the Latin American sample, we also test throughout the paper 
whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of these two countries in the Latin American sample given 
that the two European countries had significant trade linkages with their former Central and South 
American colonies. One argument for including Portugal and Spain as part of the Latin American sample is 
that remittances may have been important for these two countries during our sample period. As shown by 
Esteves (2004), remittances from Brazil were especially important for Portugal. The large drop in 
remittances during the early 1890 help explain why Portugal left the gold standard. We excluded Honduras 
from Figure 6 given that its bonds were in deep default. The coupon rate for Honduras was 2.5 times 
greater than the price of the bond for much of our sample period.   
28 British Guiana is included in the non-Latin emerging market sample because it is a member of the British 
Empire whose bonds were guaranteed by Her Majesty’s Government.  17
more than 1,200 basis points by the end of 1895. One reason that rates continued to rise in other 
Latin American countries several years after the onset of the crisis may have been related to the 
ongoing failure of Argentina to fully renegotiate its debt and establish a stable monetary 
environment or the fact that European investors were unable to assess the severity of the crisis 
due to lack of information or incomplete information. Even though the Arreglo Romero 
arrangement to reduce interest payments for five years was concluded in 1893 and GDP had 
begun to recover, no agreement for defaulted provincial debt and railway guarantees was 
concluded until after 1897 (Fishlow, 1989). Since, as noted above, Argentina may have been seen 
as a bellwether economy that was used by investors to gauge the fiscal and monetary health of 
other borrowers in the region, the delay over a full debt settlement may have raised concerns 
among foreign investors that other less-developed countries in the region would face even greater 
challenges in restoring fiscal and monetary order to their economies after the crisis. The financial 
press continued to report, three years after the onset of the crisis, how economic and political 
events in Argentina had a significant effect on bond prices throughout the region.  
“South Americans have been unsettled, in consequence of the Ministerial crisis in Buenos Ayres, 




We more carefully address the movement of the bond spreads later in the paper when we are able 
to control for country-specific factors.   
 
B. Summary Statistics of Changes in Yield Spreads 
 
The time series graphs of yield spreads and the interest-rate indexes present suggestive 
evidence that the Baring Crisis had a larger effect on Latin American borrowers compared to 
other emerging markets and core countries. To complement these figures, Tables 2-4 present 
summary statistics of changes in yield spreads between 1890 and 1894 for Latin American 
                                                 
29 Economist, July 8, 1893.  18
borrowers, non-Latin American emerging market countries, and the core countries in our sample. 
We examine the performance of emerging-market, interest-rate differentials by analyzing the one-
year, two-year, and four-year horizons after the onset of the Baring crisis: (1) July 1890-June 
1891, (2) July 1890-June 1892, and (3) July 1890-June 1894.
30   
  Table 2 shows that yield spreads for most Latin American countries increased 
dramatically in the early 1890s. Interest-rate differentials for Argentina, Colombia, and Honduras 
rose by more than 670 basis points in the first year of the crisis. The average yield spread for 
Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay increased by more than 190 basis points in the one-year 
window. The average yield spread for Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Mexico, and Nicaragua 
increased approximately 81 basis points in the year following the outbreak of the financial crisis 
in Argentina. Overall, Latin American yield spreads increased an average of 844 basis points in 
the first year after the onset of the crisis. As Table 2 shows, the large increase in yield spreads 
remains, even when Argentina is omitted (or when we include a broader definition of Latin 
America that includes Spain and Portugal).  
  Table 2 also shows that the increase in yield spreads is generally more pronounced in the 
longer sub-sample periods. Yield spreads for Argentina rose 682 basis points two years after the 
onset of the crisis and 689 basis points after five years. Country risk for Brazil increased 227 
basis points between July 1890 and June 1892, and 130 basis points between July 1890 and June 
1894. Chilean yield spreads increased 44 and 73 basis points in the two-year and four-year 
windows.  
Interest-rate differentials also rose for the smaller Latin American republics. Yield 
spreads for Colombia, Honduras, and Portugal all increased more than 700 basis points in the 
two-year window and more than 800 basis points in the four-year window. The country risk 
                                                 
30 Consistent with the graphical analysis of yield spreads, we selected July 1890 as the starting date of the 
Baring crisis. Changing the crisis date to correspond to other important events in 1890, such as the Bank of 
England’s announcement that they would rescue the House of Baring, does not change the basic tenor of 
the results that are presented in the tables and regressions. Our reading of the financial press suggests that 
the crisis had subsided by 1895. For example, see the Financial News, July 27, 1895, p.1.  19
premium for Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua increased more than 97 basis points in the 
two-year window and more than 159 basis points in the four-year window.   
The yield spread for Paraguay increased 401 basis points in the two-year sub-sample and 
908 basis points between July 1890 and June 1894. Sovereign debt prices for Spain increased 61 
and 83 basis points in the two-year and four-year windows, respectively. Unfortunately, interest 
rate data for Uruguay are not available for the two longer windows (April 1890-April 1892 and 
April 1890-April 1894). The Economist stopped reporting debt prices for this country after it 
briefly defaulted on its bonds and arranged a debt conversion with its bondholders in the early 
1890s. Yield spreads for Venezuela increased 224 basis points in the two-year window and 254 
basis points in the four-year window.  
The average yield spread for the Latin American sample increased 759 and 1,608 basis 
points in the two- and four-year periods after the onset of the financial crisis. As shown in Table 
2, the large decline in the value of Latin American securities for the two- and four-year crisis 
periods are robust to including Spain and Portugal as part of the Latin American sample or 
dropping Argentina from the analysis.   
      A very different picture emerges if we examine the time-series and cross-sectional 
behavior of non-Latin American emerging market borrowers. As Column (1) of Table 3 shows, 
the average yield spread for non-Latin American emerging markets decreased by nearly 1 basis 
point in the first year after the onset of the crisis. With the exception of Greece, yield spreads did 
not rise or fall more than 13 basis points for the non-Latin Emerging market sample. Column (2) 
reports summary statistics for yield spread changes for the non-Latin American emerging markets 
between July 1890 and June 1892. The results largely resemble the findings in Column (1) with 
yield spreads increasing about eight basis points over this period. The increase in country risk is 
almost entirely driven by Greece, whose interest-rate differential rose more than 92 basis points 
in the two-year window. If Greece is excluded from the sample, then yield spreads increased by 
almost four basis points.  20
  In the four-year window (Column 3), yield spreads increased by nearly 57 basis points 
for our sample of non-Latin American emerging markets. The result is driven again by Greece, 
which defaulted on its debts in 1893. Yield spreads only rise by eight and a half basis points if 
Greece is excluded from the sample. Nevertheless, even if Greece is included in the sample, the 
average yield spread in Latin American countries increased more than 1,600 basis points in the 
four-year window compared to an 57 basis point increase in country risk in the non-Latin 
Emerging market sample.
31 
  Table 4 reports summary statistics for the five core countries in the sample. Yield spreads 
were generally flat for the core countries in the one-year window. The country risk premium 
moved less than 21 basis points for all of the core countries. As a group, interest-rate differentials 
declined by approximately nine basis points. As shown in Columns (2) and (3), the summary 
statistics for the two-year and four-year windows resemble the results from Column (1). The 
country risk premium moved less than 30 basis points for Belgium, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. The United States experienced a 31 basis-point increase in its yield spread in the 
four-year window. French bonds showed the greatest movement in the longer windows, with 
yield spreads falling 28 basis points between July 1890 and June 1891 and declining 23 basis 
points in the four-year window. As a group, country risk moved less than three basis points for 
the high-income/core countries in our sample. Overall, yield spreads were generally very flat in 






                                                 
31 Given that many Latin American countries defaulted on their sovereign debts during this period, we also 
calculated summary statistics using bond returns as opposed to yield spreads. The basic tenor of the results 
remains unchanged using this alternative measure. The results are available from the authors upon request.  21
IV. What Factors Account for the Movement in Bond Yields during the Crisis? 
 
 
A. Panel Model and Data 
 
 
In order to further assess the regional nature of the crisis and control for country-specific 
factors, we now turn to analyzing the determinants of yield-spread movements over the period 
1886-1896. We construct a panel data set consisting of annual data for our sample of 35 emerging 
market borrowers, which includes macroeconomic indicators, trade variables, institutional 
arrangements and political factors, and country-specific controls.
32 We employ a series of country 
fixed effects models to analyze the determinants of sovereign yield spreads. In the spirit of 
Ferguson and Schularick (2006) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004), our strategy is to employ a 
variety of indicators that were readily available and widely used by emerging market investors in 
the late nineteenth century to assess country-specific financial risk. In an ideal world, we would 
also like to include modern macroeconomic variables such as gross domestic product to measure 
the economic effects of the crisis; however these data are available for only three out of ten Latin 
American countries in our annual panel sample (Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay).
33 This is in part why 
we rely on these readily available indicators – so that we can construct a data set with the largest 
possible number of potential determinants of yield spreads. Moreover, in contrast to the approach 
in Ferguson and Schularick (2006), our data exercise permits us to include fixed effects to control 
for other macroeconomic determinants that may have influenced yield spreads. We test whether 
the Baring Crisis can account for the movement in prices in Latin-America or whether the 
movement in prices in these countries is simply accounted for by macroeconomic factors or other 
                                                 
32 One reason we shift our analysis from weekly to annual frequency is so that we can control for 
macroeconomic factors that influence yield spreads. For earlier papers exploring yield spreads during the 
gold standard era, see Bordo and Rockoff  (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). 
33 The most recent historical GDP estimates are available from Angus Maddison’s website at 
www.ggdc.net/maddison/. Prados de la Escosura  (2000) provides an alternative dataset of historical GDP 
estimates for the gold standard period, 1870-1913. Although his sample covers 23 countries, it only 
includes one Latin American country (Argentina) and gives GDP estimates for five benchmark years: 1870, 
1880, 1890, 1900, and 1913.  22
country-specific effects. We also develop some measures that are used to assess whether the gold 
standard or trade linkages were potential channels of transmission from Argentina to other 
emerging-market borrowers. 
To capture how investors viewed the macroeconomic status of emerging market 
borrowers, we employ five measures: (1) a variable that measures interest-rate movements in 
emerging markets; (2) the budget deficit (expenditures-revenues) as a share of revenue; (3) the 
ratio of total public debt (internal and external) as a share of government revenue; (4) a dummy 
variable indicating whether the country is in default and has stopped servicing its foreign debt; 
and (5) the natural logarithm of the British wholesale price index. To capture general fluctuations 
in interest rates, we include an emerging market control that is the un-weighted average interest 
rate of 22 non-Latin American emerging market borrowers minus the interest rate on “risk-free” 
British consol. As for the other macroeconomic variables, a country with sound fiscal policy (as 
reflected by a small or negative ratio) should have lower sovereign risk and a lower probability of 
default since it would have a better capacity to service its debt obligation out of revenue or a 
greater ability to respond to other exogenous shocks which otherwise might make debt repayment 
more difficult. A country with a lower debt-to-revenue ratio should have a greater ability to repay 
its debts, suggesting, ceteris paribus, less sovereign risk and a lower probability of default. A 
sovereign debt default is a strong signal to the bond market that the country has serious financial 
problems and is a high credit risk. The price-level variable is included to capture the effects of 
general deflation, which may have increased the real debt burden of sovereign borrowers. 
Trade statistics were important for assessing sovereign risk in emerging markets during 
the gold standard era since measures like gross domestic product (GDP) had not been developed, 
since taxes on trade were a major source of revenue, and since exports provide a means for 
generating foreign currency to service debt denominated in sterling or gold. Annual import and 
export figures were regularly reported in investment manuals such as the Statement’s Yearbook 
and Fenn on the Funds. In particular, we consider two measures of trade that investors used to  23
assess the financial health of the borrower: (1) the trade balance (exports minus imports) scaled 
by exports, and (2) the sterling value of exports per capita. Countries with a current account 
surplus were generally regarded as having a greater ability to service their foreign debts by 
emerging market investors. As Ferguson and Schularick (2006) note, since nineteenth-century 
investors did not have GDP per capita at their disposal (to indicate the degree of institutional and 
economic development of a country), they used exports per capita as an alternative measure to 
proxy for the risk-reducing factors associated with economic development.  
Institutional and political factors may also have been used by investors to price sovereign 
debt during the late nineteenth century. Ferguson and Schularick (2006) have argued that 
membership in the British Empire lowered the risk associated with holding colonial bonds 
because Her Majesty’s government guaranteed debt repayment. We therefore code a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the borrower was a member of the British Empire. Bordo and 
Rockoff (1996) argue that the gold standard was a “good housekeeping seal of approval” that 
lowered sovereign risk for emerging market borrowers during the gold standard period. The gold 
standard was a contingent rule that solved the classic time inconsistency problem by tying the 
hands of the monetary and fiscal authorities. However, Bordo and Murshid (2001) suggest that 
adherence to the gold standard may also facilitate the transmission of shocks or contagion. 
Finally, Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) suggest that strict adherence to the gold standard may 
make it more difficult to pursue the beggar-thy-neighbor policy of devaluation. We thus code a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a country was a member of the gold club using gold- 
standard adoption dates from Meissner (2005). As for the political variables, we code 
international and civil conflict variables to capture the effects of local and interstate conflicts on 
sovereign risk based on Ferguson and Schularick (2006). The inclusion of these conflict variables 
is motivated by the frequent discussion of the effects of coup d’etats and wars on bond prices in 
the Foreign Government Securities Section of the Economist.      24
We use a number of variables to test for the presence of a regional effect in Latin 
America after the onset of the Baring Crisis. First, we code a crisis variable that takes a value of 
one beginning in 1890 until the end of the sample period (1896), when it is generally agreed that 
Argentina had recovered from the crisis. This variable potentially captures the overall effect of 
the crisis on all emerging market borrowers. Second, we interact the crisis indicator variable with 
a Latin American indicator variable to test if, ceteris paribus, yield spreads in Central and South 
America increased following the outbreak of the financial crisis.  
We also included some measures to capture potential channels through which the crisis 
may have spread. First, we coded the emerging market borrower’s trade share: exports and 
imports to the UK as a share of total trade. We use this measure to examine whether changes in 
trade affected bond spreads. We interacted the UK trade share variable with the Latin American 
dummy to analyze the effect of British trade on Central and South American yield spreads. Given 
England’s role in the Baring Crisis, an interaction term between the UK trade share variable and 
the crisis dummy is also constructed to see if the crisis spread globally through trade ties with 
England. As an additional channel, we also interacted the crisis indicator variable with an 
indicator variable for being on the gold standard in order to test whether countries that had fixed 
exchange rates had a differential effect associated with the Baring Crisis. 
The empirical model can be written as: 
(2) YLDSPREADit = βi + β1EMGCONTROLt + β2DEFAULTit + β3BUDGETBALANCEit + 
β4DEBT/REVENUEit + β5TRADEBALANCEit + β6EXPORTSPCit + β7EMPIREi + β8GOLDit + 
β9GOLD*CRISISit+ β10INTERSTATEit + β11CIVILit + β12PRICELEVELt + 
β13PRICELEVELt + β14CRISISit  + β15LATINi*CRISISit + β16UKTRADESHAREit + 
β17*UKTRADESHAREit*CRISISit + β18LATINi*UKTRADESHAREit +εit,    
    
where YLDSPREADit is the average current yield on a sovereign sterling (or gold) bond for 
country i at time t minus the current yield on the British consol and βi is a country-specific 
intercept. The independent variables are defined as:  25
•  EMGCONTROLt is an unweighted index of the average current yield of 14 non-Latin 
emerging markets minus the current yield on “risk-free” British consols at time t;
34 
•  DEFAULTit is a binary variable which is unity if country i is in default at time t; 
•  BUDGET BALANCEit is revenues minus expenditures for country i at time t; 
•  DEBT/REVENUEit  is ratio of total public debt to government revenue for country i at 
time t; 
•  TRADEBALANCEit is the current account position of country i at time t; 
•  EXPORTSPCit is the ratio of exports to population for country i at time t; 
•  EMPIREi is a binary variable which is unity if country i is a member of the British 
Empire (a time-invariant covariate in our sample period); 
•  GOLDit is a binary variable which is unity if country i is on the gold standard at time t; 
•  GOLD*CRISISit is an interaction term that is defined as country i being on the gold 
standard and in the crisis period at time t; 
•  INTERSTATEit is a binary variable which is unity if country i is involved in an interstate 
war at time t; 
•  CIVILit is a binary variable which is unity if country i is involved in a domestic war at 
time t; 
•  PRICELEVELit is the natural logarithm of the UK wholesale price index 
•  LATINi is a binary value if country i is part of Latin America; 
•  CRISISit is a binary variable which is unity for country i after the onset of the Baring 
Crisis in 1890; 
•  LATINit*CRISISit is an interaction term which is unity if country i is located in Latin 
America and the year is 1890 or later;  
•  UKTRADESHAREit is country i’s share of total trade with the UK at time t; 
•  CRISISit*UKTRADESHAREit is an interaction term between the crisis variable and a 
country’s total share of trade with the UK at time t; 
•  LATINit*UKTRADESHAREit is an interaction term between the Latin American dummy 
and a country’s total share of trade with the UK at time t; 
•  β are estimated coefficients; 
•  and ε is a white noise error term capturing other influences on yield spreads.  
 
  For the dependent variable, we constructed annual yield spreads by averaging the weekly 
data used in the time series analysis from Section III. We primarily rely on data from Ferguson 
and Schularick (2006) for the construction of various macroeconomic and trade indicators, and 
augment their data for additional countries using information from British Board of Trade 
Publications,  Fenn’s Compendium, the Statesman Yearbook, and the Annual Reports of the 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. We calculated country trade shares with the UK using these 
same sources. 
                                                 
34 Following Bordo and Rockoff (1996), Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2002), and Flandreau and Zumer 
(2004), we calculate the current yield on a sovereign bond by dividing the coupon by the price of the debt 
security.   26
B. Empirical Results of Panel Analysis 
 
The empirical results for our sample of 35 sovereign borrowers appear in Table 5.
35 All 
models are estimated with country fixed effects in order to capture unobserved differences across 
countries. To control for correlation across countries in a given year, we clustered the standard 
errors on a group-year fixed effect.
36 The group-year variable is constructed by dividing the 
sample into three groups – Latin, non-Latin, or core countries/colonies—and then multiplying the 
regional indicator by the year.
37 We specified a dummy variable to measure the effect of the 
Baring Crisis on yield spreads given that there is statistical evidence of a trend break in the Latin 
American bond yields in 1890.
38 The break in yield spreads is more consistent with the “fast and 
furious” view of contagion of Kaminsky et al. (2003), as opposed to Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
view, which suggests that shifts in coefficients are the way to test for contagion. Column (1) 
reports baseline results without the controls for the effects of the crisis. The baseline model 
captures roughly 84 percent of the variation in yield spreads. The country risk premium, ceteris 
paribus, is positively correlated with general movements in emerging-market interest rates, 
although the effect is only statistically significant at the 20-percent level. All else equal, a country 
in debt default has yield spreads that are more than 387 basis points higher than a sovereign 
borrower that is servicing its debt. An improved budget-deficit ratio reduces the country risk 
premium by nearly 30 basis points, but the effect is not statistically significant. The other 
                                                 
35 The sample of 35 borrowers includes five high-income countries (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, and the United States, 23 non-Latin emerging markets (Austria, British Guiana, Canada, Cape 
Colony, Egypt, Greece, India, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Natal, New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, 
Portugal, Spain, Russia, South Australia, Sweden, Tasmania, Turkey, Victoria, and Western Australia) and 
seven Latin emerging markets (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela). We 
drop Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Norway from our earlier, weekly sample 
due to insufficient data on covariates. Argentina is excluded from the panel regressions because it is the 
crisis country.  
36 For a discussion on techniques for dealing with correlation in cross-sectional units in fixed effects 
models, see Cameron et al. (2006). 
37 The empirical results are also robust to estimating the model with heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors or clustering on year.  
38 Application of the Banerjee et al. (1992) unit root test indicates the presence of a trend break in Latin 
American bond yields in 1890.   27
macroeconomic and trade variables (the debt-revenue ratio, the trade-balance ratio, and 
exports/population) do not have statistically or economically significant effects on sovereign 
yield spreads. Adherence to the gold standard, the price level, and the conflict variables also do 
not have statistically significant effects on the country risk premium.
39 The Latin and empire 
variables are dropped from the analysis since they are time-invariant covariates. 
  The second column of Table 5 presents results that include the Baring crisis indicator 
variable as well as the proxies used to examine the potential channels through which the crisis 
operated. Debt default continues to have a large economic and statistically significant positive 
effect on bond spreads. Yield spreads are positively correlated with the emerging-market interest- 
rate variable, although the effect is not statistically significant.
40 Consistent with the baseline 
specifications, the macroeconomic and trade variables generally do not have a statistically 
significant effect on country risk. The exception is exports per capita which significantly 
increases sovereign risk at the ten-percent level. Membership in the gold standard and the conflict 
variables also do not lower sovereign risk. We also find some evidence that countries with a 
larger share of trade with the UK have lower sovereign yields, although this effect is not 
economically or statistically significant. The price level variable also does not have a statistically 
significant effect on country risk.  The statistical insignificance of the price level variable in the 
two regressions suggests that deflation does not contribute towards explaining the behavior of 
country risk in our sample period after controlling for other factors. 
Turning to the variables specifically concerned with the crisis, the Baring Crisis does not 
seem to have impacted all sovereign borrowers: the crisis indicator variable is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. However, there is some support for the hypothesis that 
adherence to the gold standard lowered sovereign risk during the Baring crisis: that is, the 
                                                 
39 It may not be that surprising that the gold standard effect by itself is statistically insignificant, since with 
country dummies included, all the identification is off the time dimension; there are likely too few 
“switchers” during the 1886-96 period to estimate this effect precisely. 
40 The emerging market control is significant at the one-percent level if the price level variable is dropped 
from the analysis.  28
interaction effect between the gold standard and the crisis variable is statistically significant at the 
one-percent level. Bond market investors may have viewed gold adherence as a signal that a 
country would pursue prudent monetary and fiscal policies during a period of financial 
turbulence.
41 
Consistent with the summary statistics and graphical evidence presented earlier in the 
paper, the Latin-crisis variable (the interaction between a Latin America indicator variable and 
the Baring Crisis indicator) has a large positive effect on yield spreads that is statistically 
significant at the five-percent level. The point estimate suggests that the crisis increased yield 
spreads in Central and South America by 214 basis points. It also appears that trade may have 
been a channel through which the crisis spread. The UK trade share variable interacted with the 
crisis dummy increases country risk by roughly 20 basis points (evaluating the point estimate of 1 
at the mean UK trade share of 20), although the effect is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (19 percent level of significance).
42 The UK trade share variable interacted 
with the Latin American raises country risk by approximately 80 basis points (evaluating the 
point estimate of 10 at the mean UK trade share in Latin America of 8). This additional effect on 
Latin American spreads is significant at the twenty-percent level of significance.
43 To test the 
joint significance of the crisis variables, we took the partial derivative of yield spreads with 
respect to the crisis dummy variable. The three variables raise country risk by nearly 240 basis 
points for Latin American countries and are jointly significant at the one percent level.
44  
                                                 
41 On the other hand, the interaction may be picking up another way of measuring the net effect of the crisis 
in that departure from gold is often causally related to a financial crisis. 
42 We also estimated a model that included an additional independent variable: the Latin American crisis 
dummy interacted with the UK trade share variable. This triple interaction variable (Latin*crisis*UK trade 
share) is statistically significant at the five-percent level in the fixed effects model. However, the 
correlation between the Latin American crisis dummy and the triple interaction variable is 90 percent. 
Given the high correlation between the two interaction variables and the fact that the UK trade share 
variable is relatively constant over our sample period, we interpret the statistical significance of the triple 
interaction variable as evidence consistent with the baseline results reported in Column 2 of Table 5.  
43 We obtain similar results if Portugal and Spain are included as part of the Latin American sample. The 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
44 If we take the partial derivative of yield spreads with respect to the Latin American dummy variable, then 
we find that the interaction terms are jointly significant at the 10-percent level.    29
   
C. Discussion 
 
The two variables which drive the panel analysis, in terms of both economic and 
statistical significance, are debt default and the Latin American-crisis interaction effect. The 
economic interpretation of the debt default variable is relatively straightforward: countries that 
had a history of poor repayment and had defaulted borrowed at higher rates. The Latin American-
crisis dummy is open to greater interpretation. One interpretation is that the interaction term is 
simply capturing some omitted effect that is common to all Central American and South 
American borrowers during the crisis. Another interpretation is that the large and statistically 
significant coefficient on the Latin American-crisis interaction may indicate that European 
investors sold off or reduced their holdings of Latin American bonds following revelations of 
Argentina’s economic problems and news of its debt default in 1890.  
Investors may have not been paying adequate attention to individual country 
characteristics prior to the onset of the crisis or they may have responded by rebalancing their 
portfolios of emerging market debt. The behavior of sovereign yield spreads before and after the 
onset of the Baring Crisis is consistent with two possible explanations: (1) investors experienced 
a wake-up call and withdrew their funds from countries similar to Argentina and/or (2) a common 
creditor (British investors) reallocated their portfolio away from Latin American debt. A “wake 
up call” would suggest that Argentina’s default signaled the potential for crises to occur in other 
countries; given this new information and the belief that other Latin American countries had 
characteristics that were broadly similar to Argentina, emerging market investors then sold their 
Latin American securities.
45 This interpretation is similar to what some economists suggested 
occurred during the East Asia crisis (Radelet and Sachs, 1999). The fact that the bond spreads did 
                                                 
45 The Economist noted the bellwether status of Argentina during this period, noting that bond prices of 
other South American securities moved when Argentina moved (Economist, April 29, 1893).  30
not rise for the Latin American countries in the months preceding the crisis is consistent with a 
wake-up call interpretation of the Baring Crisis and similar to what has been observed during the 
East Asian Crisis.
46   
Incomplete information about the financial health and growth prospects of particular 
Latin American countries may have made it difficult for investors to assess risk on a country-by-
country basis prior to Argentina’s default, and may have contributed to a sell off of Latin 
American debt. It might also help explain why a wake up call occurred. 
47 The fact that European 
investors lacked all the information they desired is well documented by the Corporations of 
Bondholders (CFB), which represented British lenders, and which was created, in part, to provide 
better information on sovereign borrowers (Mauro and Yafeh, 2003). Despite the efforts of 
British bondholders, the written records of this organization (the Annual Reports of the CFB) 
consistently reveal the frustration of bondholders in their attempts to obtain accurate and timely 
reports on the fiscal balance, monetary emissions, and tax collection of debtor nations during the 
gold standard period.  
Although it would be difficult to design a definitive test of the role of asymmetric 
information during our sample period, we carried out some sensitivity testing that provides some 
additional insight into the problems of asymmetric information with respect to Latin America. We 
estimated a model where we explain the variation in yield spreads for emerging market borrowers 
using the available information on country-specific macroeconomic and financial characteristics, 
but excluding Latin American debtors from the sample. We find that the macroeconomic and 
trade variables (as well as the conflict variables) generally have a statistically significant effect in 
                                                 
46 Sovereign credit ratings for East Asian economies by major private credit-rating agencies did not decline 
in the 18-month run up to the East Asian financial crisis. This has been cited as evidence that rating 
agencies and private creditors were asleep at the wheel prior to the outbreak of the crisis in Thailand 
(Goldstein, 1998).  
47 There is some evidence that the “wake up call” that may have occurred during the East Asian financial 
crisis was exacerbated by asymmetric information problems. According to Goldstein (1998, p.19), 
“creditors did not have accurate information on the creditworthiness of Asian borrowers (e.g., external debt 
turned out to be much larger, and international reserves much smaller, than indicated by publicly available 
data).” Of course, for our period, the problems may have involved both inaccurate and incomplete 
information.   31
the explaining the cross-sectional behavior of yield spreads for non-Latin emerging market 
borrowers.
48 The fact that a regression model can explain non-Latin yield spreads, but not Latin 
American interest rates, provides some statistical evidence that asymmetric information may have 
played a role in the financial crisis (or alternatively that the quality of economic information on 
sovereign borrowers in Latin America was relatively poor).  Even if such information had 
predictive power, it was lacking for many countries of interest in the region: several Central and 
South American countries, which we would have like to have included in our full panel 
specification, lacked adequate financial and trade data from conventional sources that were 
available to investors in the 1890s (such as the Investor’s Monthly Manual and the Statesman’s 
Yearbook). The paucity of data for the region made it a more challenging environment for 
investors to discern good risk from bad risk, and may help explain the sell off Latin American 
debt. 
The presence of a common creditor may also help explain the large increase in Latin 
American interest rates following the onset of the Baring Crisis.
49 Investment banks that lent to 
Argentina were largely concentrated in London. Harmed by the Argentine default, they may have 
decided to cut back on their investments in the entire Latin American region to reduce their 
exposure to risk of a similar variety. Since other countries in their region had trade patterns, fiscal 
histories, and corporate governance similar to Argentina, this may have induced UK investors to 
reallocate their portfolios and shift funds to other parts of the world like the British Empire or 
other emerging markets. Such an unwinding of positions does not necessarily proceed at a rapid 
pace, and may also help explain why bond spreads continued to rise more than a year after the 
crisis.  
                                                 
48 For example, unlike the baseline results reported in Column 2 of Table 5, we find that the debt-to-
revenue ratio significantly raises yield spreads by approximately 120 basis points, interstate war raises 
sovereign risk by 46 basis points, and a better trade balance lowers sovereign risk at the five percent. Debt 
default raises yield spreads by 660 basis points and exports per capita increases sovereign risk by about 15 
basis points.   
49 A common-creditor channel has been used to explain recent episodes of financial contagion in East Asia 
and Latin America (Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens, 2002).  32
As a way to test the common creditor hypothesis, we re-estimated the empirical model in 
Column 2 of Table 5, adding two interaction terms to measure the effects of the Baring Crisis 
outside of Latin America. First, we interacted the empire indicator variable with the crisis dummy 
to test the hypothesis that European investors may have sold-off or reduced their holdings of 
Latin American securities and purchased “British-guaranteed” colonial bonds or debt in non-
Latin emerging markets. Then, we interacted the non-empire emerging market variable with the 
crisis dummy to capture the effect of the Baring Crisis on British colonies and developing 
countries outside of Latin America. Although the empire interaction variable is not statistically 
significant, we find some evidence that yield spreads in non-Empire, non-Latin Emerging market 
actually declined about 42 basis points following the outbreak of the crisis.
50 The falling yield 
spreads (and hence rising prices of non-Latin emerging market debt) provide some evidence that 
UK investors shifted some of their funds to non-Latin emerging markets during the early 1890s. 
Overall, the empirical analysis suggests that sovereign yield spreads in Latin America 
significantly increased in the years following the outbreak of the Baring Crisis.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
  This paper offers quantitative evidence of the effects of the Baring Crisis on a global 
sample of emerging market borrowers. Using a new database of more than 15,000 bond prices 
collected from the Economist, we find that the Baring Crisis was largely a regional phenomenon. 
The average sovereign yield spread for Latin American countries in our sample increased by 844, 
759, and 1,608 basis points in the one-year, two-year, and four-year periods after the onset of the 
financial crisis. On the other hand, yield spreads in non-Latin emerging markets and core 
countries were generally flat during the same period.   
                                                 
50 The crisis and Latin American-crisis interaction variables are both significant at the 5-percent level of 
significance.  33
  We then analyzed the determinants of sovereign yield spreads between 1886 and 1896 in 
a panel framework to shed greater light on the regional nature of the crisis. We were particularly 
interested in determining whether the Latin American effect could be explained by 
macroeconomic fundamentals (a budget deficit ratio, a ratio of debt-to-revenue, a default 
indicator variable), trade indicators (trade balance, exports per capita), political variables 
(interstate and domestic conflict) and institutional variables (such as being on the gold standard) – 
information available to emerging market investors in the late nineteenth century. The empirical 
analysis of sovereign yield spreads using fixed-effects models in a panel framework suggests 
several conclusions. Macroeconomic indicators such as the debt burden, the budget deficit, and 
the trade deficit as well as the political variables were generally not very important for pricing 
sovereign debt during this turbulent period. On the other hand, we find that countries that 
suspended debt service were charged much higher interest rates in financial markets. The results 
also suggest that being on the gold standard offered safe haven for borrowers that committed to 
this policy regime during the crisis of the 1890s and that trading more with the UK increased 
country risk during the crisis.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the results suggest the existence of a large Latin 
American effect, even after controlling for both observed and unobserved differences across 
countries. Yield spreads were more than 200 basis points higher for Latin American countries 
during the crisis. Statistical and historical evidence suggests that European investors sold off or 
reduced their holdings of Latin American bonds. Investors re-assessed sovereign risk in Latin 
America and reduced their holdings of government bonds issued by countries in the region, 
perhaps in part due to informational problems and in part to diversify away from region-specific 
risk. Although it is difficult to identify a single explanation that accounts for the dramatic decline 
in Latin American bond prices in the early 1890s, the empirical results of this paper nevertheless 
document that the Baring Crisis was largely a crisis confined to Latin America; it appears to have 
had little effect on other emerging market borrowers. As more financial and macroeconomic data  34
from the area become available, future research will undoubtedly shed more light on the regional 
nature of the Baring crisis.   
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Table 1. Central and South American Events Reported in the Investor’s Monthly Manual  
 
March 26, 1890  Argentine Government announces its resolve to meet the economic crisis by 
immediately adopting energetic measures, some of which they specify. 
April 2, 1890  Registration of the Peruvian Corporation, formed to carry out conversion of 
debt. 
April 16, 1890  Resignation of Argentine Ministry, and announcement of project purchase of 
Western Railway of Buenos Ayres by an Anglo-French syndicate. 
May 14, 1890  Expected withdrawal of gold for the Argentine Republic. Mexican Senate 
passes a bill for the funding of the railroad debt. 
May 28, 1890  Uruguayan Finance Committee recommends the government to issue a new 
loan in connection with the budget deficit. 
June 11, 1890  Resignation of the Argentine Finance Minister, Signor Uriburu. 
July 2, 1890  Negotiations for loan of 5,000,000 pounds to Argentina, which ultimately 
prove abortive. Argentine National Bank suspends interim dividend. 
July 9, 1890  Financial crisis in Uruguay. 
July 23, 1890  Revolt in Buenos Ayres, with three or four days’ fighting. Fighting in Central 
America and San Salvador. 
July 30, 1890  The Argentine insurrection results in a nominal victory for the government. 
August 6, 1890  President Celman of the Argentine Republic, yielding at last to public feeling, 
resigns, and the Ministry is changed.  
August 13, 1890  Directors of Argentine National Bank resign 
August 27, 1890  Brazilian decree issued practically establishing a system of Cedula issues. 
September 3, 1890   Proposal in Argentine Congress to suspend payments on Cedulas for two 
years rejected. Mexican loan, 8,000,000 pounds, for redemption of railway 
subsidies. 
September 10, 1890  New Argentine Railway concessions annulled-Finance Minister’s message 
refers to entanglement of Government in monetary affairs-and to insolvency 
in Buenos Ayres. 
September 17, 1890  Dr. Plaza appointed in Argentina to visit Europe on a financial mission, 
principally to arrange a 4,000,000 pound loan. 
September 24, 1890  Argentine Federal government proposes to assume provincial liabilities. 
October 29, 1890  Issue of Brazilian Decree rendering import duties payable in gold. 
November 19, 1890  Fall of Barings announced simultaneously with “Guarantee” scheme of 
assistance. Committee formed to inquire and suggest as to Argentine affairs. 
November 26, 1890  Chilian government refuses proposed terms of settlement of Dreyfus claim. 
December 3, 1890  Argentine Committee reports its conclusions. 
December 10, 1890  German delegate to Argentine Conference issues his report. 
December 17, 1890 
 
A scheme is propounded for the conversion of the Argentine Cedula issues.  
December 30, 1890 
 
Dr. Plaza intimates the willingness of the [Argentine] government to accept 
the proposals of the Rothschild Committee subject to minor modifications. 
Cordova and Entre Rios announce that interest payments on their coupons are 







Table 2. Average Changes in Latin American Yield Spreads, 1890-1894 
      
Country  July 1890-June 1891  July 1890-June 1892  Jul 1890-June 1894 
Argentina   675.26 682.53  689.44 
      
Brazil   44.58 227.05  130.06 
      
Chile   90.06 44.3  73.44 
      
Colombia   1263.79 875.23  1871.72 
      
Costa Rica   139.54 190.1 332.3 
      
Guatemala   291.69 168.52  972.53 
      
Honduras   7136.3 5357.85  11912.38 
      
Mexico   44.77 75.83  389.39 
      
Nicaragua†  33.84 96.67  159.14 
      
Paraguay   113.35 401.87  908.78 
      
Portugal   162.98 723.04  836.51 
      
Spain   -0.22 61.5  83.19 
      
Uruguay   202.48 NA  NA 
      
Venezuela   94.07 224.15  252.39 
      
Group Average  
(without Spain and Portugal)  844.14 758.55  1608.33 
Group Average  
(with Spain and Portugal)  735.18 702.2  1431.64 
      
Group Average  
(without Argentina)  739.79 703.84  1493.49 
      
Either the percentage change in prices or the increase or decrease in yield spreads (measured in basis 
points) is reported. 
† Nicaragua unilaterally reduced its interest rates on the interest on its bonds from 4 to 6 percent 













Austria   -11.14 -3.87 -10.12 
     
British Guiana   7.68 22.5  37.25 
     
Canada   0.84 0.71  0.5 
     
Cape of Good Hope (South 
Africa)  -2.6 4.67 3.74 
     
Egypt   -9.82 -6.83  -19.07 
     
Greece   32.22 92.29  1071.07 
     
India   3.94 3.07 4.53 
     
Italy   -7.29 3.64  105.77 
     
Jamaica   -10.52 -7.13  -7.76 
     
Japan   -12.62 0.71  7.62 
     
Natal  11.88 23.04 22.23 
     
New South Wales    -6.56 0.71 3.89 
     
New Zealand   -4.7 2.57  -8.33 
     
Norway   5.94 9.99  10.65 
     
Queensland   -2.75 8.4 11.43 
     
Russia   -2.88 11.96 -16.5 
     
South Australia   -2.83 4.44 15.16 
     
Sweden   -2.75 -3.02 11.43 
     
Tasmania   -2.68 0.71 7.62 
     
Ottoman Empire (Turkey )  3.05 5.47 2.95 
     
Victoria   3.89 7.86 7.86 
     
Western Australia   -10.37 -6.83  -10.7 
     
Group Average  -0.91 7.96 56.87 




Table 4. Average Changes in Core Market Yield Spreads, 1890-1894 
      
Country  July 1890-June 1891  July 1890-June 1892  July 1892-June 1894 
Belgium   -19.86 -9.37  -2.46 
      
France   -20.74 -28.05 -22.68 
      
Germany   -10.29 -6.69  3.89 
     
Netherlands   1.25 12.58  -20.12 
     
US  4.37 17.39  33.29 
     
Group Average  -9.06 -2.83 -1.62 
     
Either the percentage change in prices or the increase or decrease in yield spreads (measured in basis 
























Emerging Market Control  1.808  2.494 
 (1.37)  (1.54) 
Default 386.685**  347.820** 
 (174.09)  (167.73) 
Budget Deficit Ratio  -29.908  -56.99 
 (30.37)  (44.24) 
Debt/Revenue -7.579  0.098 
 (13.87)  (12.80) 
Trade Balance Ratio  12.416  -7.051 
 (24.05)  (24.96) 
Exports Per Capita  3.03  9.215* 
 (4.84)  (5.41) 
Empire       
       
Gold   -79.165  -48.105 
 (76.69)  (92.30) 
Gold*Crisis   -74.987*** 
   (28.25) 
International Conflict  8.772  -16.915 
 (40.20)  (31.52) 
Civil Conflict  -3.462  -45.733 
 (35.55)  (36.59) 
Price Level  -126.495  121.171 
 (344.71)  (365.01) 
Latin      
      
Crisis   11.101 
   (24.63) 
Latin*Crisis   213.690** 
   (107.36) 
Empire*Crisis   -2.028 
   (23.54) 
UK Trade Share    -2.639 
   (2.26) 
Crisis*UK Trade Share    1.05 
   (0.79) 
Latin*UK Trade Share    9.893 
   (7.73) 
Observations 375  368 
R-squared 0.84  0.86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
Figure 1 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Belgium (1874), 3%, perpetuity bonds 
French Rentes, 3%, perpetuity bonds 
Netherlands, 2.5%, perpetuity bonds. 
Prussian Consols, 3%, perpetuity bonds 
USA 4%, due 1907 
 
Latin American Countries 
Argentina (1884), 5%, final redemption 1921 
Brazil (1888), 4.5%, redemption by sinking-fund of 1 percent per annum 
Chile (1885), 4.5%, redeemable by a sinking-fund of ½ percent per year  
Colombia (1873), 4.75%, in default 
Costa Rica A, 5%, sinking-fund commences in 1898 to begin redeeming the bonds 
Guatemala, 4% 
Honduras (1867), 10%, in default 
Mexico (1888), 6%, irredeemable after 1892 
Nicaragua (1886), 4%-begin 6% December 29, 1894 
Paraguay (1886), 1.5%, redeemable by sinking-fund beginning in 1896 
Portugal, 3%, change to 1% in November, 1895 
Spain, 4%, perpetuity bonds 
Uruguay Consol, 3% 
Venezuela (1859), 3%, redeemable by semi-annual sinking-fund 
 
Non-Latin Emerging Markets 
Austrian Gold Bonds (consols), 4%, perpetuity bonds 
British Guiana, 4%, 1935  
Canada, 4%, due 1904-08 
Cape of Good Hope (1881), 4%, final redemption in 1922 
Greece (1881), 5%, final redemption in 1921 
India, 3%, due October 5, 1948 
Italy (ex 25f), 5%, perpetuity bonds 
Jamaica, 4%, Inscribed, 1934 
Japan (1873), 7%, final redemption in 1898 
New South Wales, 4%, due 1903-5-8-9-10 
New Zealand Inscribed Stock, 4%, final redemption in 1929 
Norway, 3%, final redemption in 1965 
Queensland, 4%, due 1913 
Russia (1822), 5%, perpetuity bonds 
South Australia, 4%, due 1929 
Sweden (1880), 4%, final redemption in 1930 
Tasmania, 4%, due July 8, 1908 
Turkey (1854, Egyptian Tribute), 5%, final redemption in 1927 
Victoria, 4.5%, due 1904 
Western Australia, 4%, due 1927    





































Baring9091  -.538*** 
(.177) 
  
Baring9092    -.391*** 
(.146) 
 
Baring9094      -.392*** 
(.115) 
R-squared 0.028  0.030 0.030 0.030 




(Dependent Variable  Bond Return for Latin American Country i, excluding Argentina, Portugal, 



































Baring9091  -.526*** 
(197) 
  
Baring9092     -.285* 
(.160) 
 
Baring9094       -.275*** 
(.126) 
R-squared  0.030  0.030 0.030 0.030 




    
Notes for Appendix Table A 
 
Panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) are in parentheses. The regressions were estimated for the 
period January 1887 through December 1895 using weekly bond price data collected from the 
Economist. *denotes significance at the 10-percent level. **denotes significance at the 5-percent 
level. ***denotes significance at the 1-percent level. 
 
The following model is employed to estimate the effect of the Baring Crisis on weekly Latin 
American bond returns: 
 
(1) LATINBRETit= αi + β1EMGRETt + β2CRISISt + εit, 
where LATINBRETit is the return on a “representative” sovereign bond for Latin American 
country i at time t. The return for Latin American country i's representative bond is measured as 
the first difference of the natural logarithm of the price at time t. αi is a time-invariant constant for 
each country. EMGRETt is the emerging market control, which is computed as the first difference 
of the natural logarithm of the (unweighted) average price of the 14 non-Latin American 
emerging market bonds in our sample. We include CRISISt to measure the differential impact of 
the Baring Crisis on Latin American bond returns at three different time horizons: 1890-91, 1890-
92, and 1890-94. These indicator variables allow us to test whether bond returns in Latin America 
were significantly lower than bond returns for core-country securities one-year, two-years, and 
four-years after the onset of the financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 